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RESEARCH ARTICLE
ABSTRACT
Today, there is a growing fear of resurfacing protectionism, from United States’ trade-
war with China, to UK’s Brexit, to the less known trade-restricting measures adopted 
by countries globally. The General Agreement on Trade & Tariff (GATT), superseded 
by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) since 1995, rendered the classic forms of 
protectionism such as tariffs obsolete. However, it did not defeat protectionism; 
instead, protectionism has evolved through its protean capacity to adapt into new and 
often undetectable forms, now labelled as ‘murky’ protectionism (e.g. competition law 
enforcement and the recent bailout packages). It is argued that there are two ways 
in which States can utilise competition law to impair free-trade and restrict foreign 
firms’ access to domestic markets: the exemption of certain anticompetitive conduct 
under national competition law and the strategic application of domestic competition 
law. This article considers competition law as an instrument of protectionist policy 
with comparative analysis of the US and the European Union. Using an international 
political economy (IPE) perspective underpinned by overlapping theories of (legal/
political) realism, this article establishes that, while no direct robust empirical evidence 
of protectionist motivations on competition law enforcement exists, particularly on 
‘merger regulation and export cartel exemptions’, the presence of political elements on 
the decision-making, the wide discretion granted to competition authorities and the 
‘sponge’ nature of competition law present an opportunity for the use of competition 
law for protectionist tendencies. 
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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION
Today, there is a growing fear of rising protectionism, from 
the United States (US) under the Trump administration’s 
imposition of tariffs and a trade war with China, to 
the United Kingdom’s Brexit, to the less known trade-
restricting measures adopted by other countries all over 
the world.1
The neoclassical economic model suggests the 
desirability of free trade over protectionism because 
free trade lowers prices, allows a flow of goods with 
little restrictions and improves the quality of products, 
resulting in overall welfare gain.2 On the other hand, 
protectionism results in welfare losses, increased prices 
and a decline in innovation, thus harming consumers 
and economic efficiency.3
The natural inclination of states to engage in 
protectionism is as old as time and, until today, has never 
been diminished.4 The General Agreement on Trade & 
Tariff (GATT),5 superseded by World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) since 1995, rendered the classical forms of 
protectionism such as tariffs obsolete. However, it did 
not defeat protectionism; instead, protectionism has 
evolved through its protean capacity to adapt into new 
and often undetectable forms,6 now labelled as ‘murky’ 
protectionism.7
Competition law enforcement is suspected as one of 
the forms of this murky protectionism. There are two 
ways (among others) considered in this article in which 
States can utilise competition law to impair free trade 
and restrict access of foreign firms to domestic market. 
First is the exemption under national competition law 
such as export cartel exemptions; second is the strategic 
application of domestic competition law, e.g. alleged 
discriminatory and selective enforcement of merger 
regulation.8
It appears that States use their competition law as 
invincible trade barriers to further their protectionist bids 
such as national security and environmental protection.9 
In recent years, States have been accused of using their 
competition law to pursue protectionism. For instance, 
the US has criticised the EU’s merger regulation as 
protecting competitors and not competition, particularly 
in the technology industry in mergers involving non-EU 
firms – even when those same acquisitions are approved 
by other competition authorities. A good example is 
the Commission’s 2001 decision to block the $42 billion 
acquisition of Honeywell by General Electric.10 Similarly, 
the US is being encouraged to change their stance 
on leniency towards export cartels due to its beggar-
thy-neighbour effect.11 Investigating the controversy 
around the use of competition law for protectionist 
ends is particularly relevant today to protect and 
uphold free trade and liberalisation. There is a gap 
between competition and trade policies which national 
competition law fails to address and the WTO rules fail to 
regulate. Merger regulation and export cartel exemptions 
appear to be used as tools for protectionist ends to 
exploit the gap. This article, therefore, examines whether 
States use their competition law to pursue protectionist 
policy in the EU and the US. In this context, the article 
specifically focuses on analysing how merger regulation 
and treatment of export cartel further protectionism.12
In terms of method and approach, the article 
uses the international political economy (IPE) 
perspective underpinned by (legal/political) realism and 
interdisciplinary, theoretical-analytical perspectives 
within the framework of international competition 
law. It employs (comparative) qualitative empirical 
evidence from the EU and US for comparative analysis. 
The international political economic perspective is used 
to analyse how the presence of political elements and 
influences on decision-making reflect the enforcing 
jurisdiction’s national environment, culture, priorities 
and goals by presenting an opportunity for the use of 
competition law for protectionist bids. Meanwhile, the 
interdisciplinary and theoretical-analytical perspective 
is used to employ literature in the legal, economics, 
international relations and international politics areas.13 
This is empirically analysed within the framework of 
(international) competition law. The (comparative) 
qualitative empirical evidence is employed by gathering 
relevant material from the European Union and the 
United States of America for an in-depth analysis.
The article adopts legal/political realism theory in the 
analysis section to demonstrate that the regulation of 
competition law by regulators/competition authorities 
in the EU (mainly, the EU Commission)14 and in the 
USA (the US Department of Justice and the Federal 
Trade Commission)15 is highly influenced by the public 
policy of the nation. In simple parlance, legal realism 
is a theory that all law derives from prevailing social 
interests and public policy. According to legal realist 
theory, judges consider not only abstract rules, but 
also social interest and public policy, when deciding a 
case.16 Legal realism is a diverse school of thought and 
any attempt to homogenise it will distort more than 
simplify,17 since its influence goes beyond being a mere 
theory of adjudication.18 Judges more often than not 
promote social ends; just as Cardozo admitted, a judge 
may be tempted to substitute their view for that of the 
community.19 From this perspective, the legal realist is 
attached to social reform and they want law to serve as 
an instrument for social action. To achieve this, realist 
thought, policy objectives and interrelationship between 
legal rules had to become more intimate.20
Political realism is a theory that attempts to explain, 
model, and prescribe political relations. It proposes that 
power is (or ought to be) the primary end of political 
action, whether in the domestic realm or international 
arena. In the domestic realm, the theory contends that 
politicians do, or should, strive to maximise their power, 
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whilst in the international arena, nation States are the 
primary agents that maximise, or ought to maximise, 
their power. In the context of nation States, the 
proposition is that a nation can only advance its interests 
against the interests of other nations; this implies that 
the international environment is inherently unstable.21 
Realism emphasizes power and the national interest 
and directs more attention to political security than to 
economic issues.22 Realism is equated to, if not related to, 
mercantilism, also known as protectionism.23 To obtain 
political security, realists enrich their power and wealth at 
the expense of their neighbouring States, often through 
an increase in exports and decrease in imports.24 IPE is 
concerned with the interaction of economics and politics 
in the international sphere.25 Politics is represented by 
the State as a sovereign political unit and economics is 
represented by the market as a system of production 
and consumption at a price determined by supply and 
demand.26
Based on the political and economic dimensions 
involved in the interplay of competition law and trade 
policy, particularly protectionism, it is the position of this 
article that realist theory, along with an IPE perspective, 
is relevant in understanding why nation States use 
competition law as a protectionist bid in their trade 
policy. 
The article is structured into five broad sections; this 
section, Section 1 is the general introduction and set 
out the method, including the theoretical approach 
used in the article. Section 2 provides a brief conceptual 
understanding of the relevant concepts in the article 
which have divergent conceptual interpretations within 
academic literature. Section 3 discusses the relationship 
between competition law and other issues areas such 
as trade policy, protectionism and others. Section 4 
analyses competition law and protectionism in the two 
case studies, EU and US, by using specific competition 
law instruments: (i) merger regulation and (ii) treatment 
of export cartels to investigate and analyse how they 
are used for protectionism, including a brief comparative 
analysis. Finally, Section 5 summarises and concludes 
the article.  
SECTION 2: A CONCEPTUAL 
UNDERSTANDING OF RELEVANT 
CONCEPTS 
Looking at academic literature, scholars have provided 
divergent conceptual views or interpretations of relevant 
competition law concepts that appear in the article. 
(I) COMPETITION
Competition, in its broad economic sense, is the process 
whereby firms struggle to win against each other. 
Competition law, also known as antitrust in the United 
States, refers to the legal rules and standards which 
aim to protect the process of competition by dealing 
with market imperfections and restoring desirable 
competitive conditions in the market.27 Competition 
policy, on the other hand, is broader than competition 
law and covers the full range of government measures 
that could promote competitive market structures and 
behaviour, including trade liberalisation measures.28 
Views on the necessity of the enactment of competition 
law to implement competition policy remain divided.29 
The neo-classical economics case for competition argues 
competition provides various benefits such as lower 
prices, efficiency, and innovation.30 There is no consensus 
on the goals of competition law. Some scholars suggest 
that competition law is akin to a sponge or that it is a 
fluid concept influenced by varying objectives, policies, 
culture; hence, the goals vary based on each enacting 
jurisdiction.31 On the other hand, one of the prominent 
scholars of the Chicago school of competition analysis 
suggests that the ultimate goal of competition law is 
economic efficiency, which is equated to consumer 
welfare maximisation.32 Nonetheless, the most 
commonly declared goal of competition law is to protect 
and encourage competition to achieve the optimal 
resource allocation and maximise consumer welfare.33
As a result of these diverging goals and enforcement 
policies of competition law, several scholars proposed 
for the internalisation, or at least harmonisation, of 
competition law.34 Some scholars such as Fox and Manne 
and Weinberger, recognising the restrictive effect on trade 
by anticompetitive practices, called for the alignment of 
competition law within the WTO Framework. However, 
this failed to materialise as a result of the diverging views 
of the member States.35
(II) MERGER
Under a business or firm perspective, mergers36 are 
motivated by efficiency goals as explained by efficiency 
theory, strategy to increase market power as explained 
by market power hypothesis, or simply the managers’ 
greed or overconfidence as explained by the hubris 
hypothesis.37 Efficiency theory suggests that firms 
will merge if there is a potential to generate sufficient 
realisable synergies beneficial to all the merging parties.38 
Synergies comprise of collusive, operational and financial 
synergy.39 Operational synergies are manifested in 
resulting economies of scale and economies of scope as 
they mainly relate to production and/or administrative 
efficiencies; financial synergy refers to cost savings, 
and collusive synergy refers to expansion of market 
power as supported by the market power hypothesis.40 
Alternatively, hubris hypothesis argues that decisions to 
merge are the result of managements’ overestimation of 
the resulting benefits to the business due to the managers’ 
overconfidence in decision-making.41 Nonetheless, each 
merger transaction is unique; hence, there is no single 
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theory that encapsulates the motivations for pursuing 
these transactions.42
Under the legal perspective, however, a merger simply 
refers to a combination of two or more corporations into 
a single entity, regardless of business reason or mode of 
acquisition.43 For competition authorities, mergers pose 
a concern because of the merging firms’ potential to 
accumulate or expand market power, which can distort 
competition through monopoly or abuse of dominance.44
However, empirical analyses negate the 
protectionism hypothesis, at least with the perspective 
of the EU competition law. Initial studies found a positive 
correlation between the likelihood of opposition to 
mergers involving foreigners and the foreseen negative 
impact of the merger on domestic competitors.45 Yet, 
after the 2004 reforms introduced EU merger regulation, 
a re-examination of the protectionist hypothesis showed 
a shift in the protectionist tendencies of the enforcement 
authority.46 Recent research affirmed the results of this 
re-examination and found that the EU Commission 
committed no discrimination in its enforcement of merger 
regulation, whether in frequency or intensity, in mergers 
involving foreign firms.47 These empirical analyses, at 
least in the EU context, show that competition authorities 
did not use their merger control power to intervene on 
mergers involving non-EU or US acquirers. Nevertheless, 
they fail to conclusively prove that protectionism with 
merger regulation does not exist. Conversely, qualitative 
analyses examining merger decisions and the text of the 
merger regulations claim that merger regulation is used, 
or at least could potentially be used, for protectionist 
purposes such as promotion of national champions.48
(III) EXPORT CARTELS
A cartel is an association of rivals agreeing to fix prices 
above the competitive level, limit output below the 
competitive level or allocate markets between or 
amongst themselves in order to maximise their profits.49 
Cartels, generally, have been labelled as the ‘supreme 
evil of antitrust’50 and the ‘primary evil of global trade’.51 
On the other hand, export cartels are cartels that only 
operate in foreign markets and do not directly affect the 
markets in the jurisdiction where the cartel members are 
located.52 While there is a consensus among the world’s 
competition authorities to prohibit hard-core cartels,53 
there is lack of clarity and transparency surrounding 
the treatment of export cartels. It is argued that export 
cartels receive considerable political support,54 not 
only because of its benefits to the exporting country, 
but also because it is argued that export cartels are 
not necessarily pure evil like hard-core cartels.55 Export 
cartels may have the same goals as hard-core cartels 
– to fix prices or allocate markets – but they may also 
have strictly efficiency-enhancing goals such as sharing 
marketing and transportation costs.56
According to economic theory, export cartels raise 
domestic producer welfare without diminishing domestic 
consumer welfare.57 Additional export revenues and 
increases in national welfare incentivises exporting States 
to tolerate, if not promote, export cartels.58 Furthermore, 
since the adverse effects of export cartels are externalised 
or felt exclusively by importing States, exporting States 
possessing the territorial jurisdiction over the cartel have 
very little interest in disciplining the conduct.59 On the 
other hand, importing States which have the motivation 
to prevent the conduct due to its anticompetitive effect 
and corresponding reduction in their consumer welfare 
do not have the territorial jurisdiction and must rather 
apply their competition laws extra-territorially to 
sanction the cartel.60 However, since exporting States 
are not motivated to sanction the cartel, or even induced 
to promote or tolerate the cartel because of its positive 
domestic effect, they may block any extraterritorial 
enforcement by the importing States through exemptions 
or non-cooperation.61 This conflicting interest presents a 
competition law enforcement dilemma on export cartels.
Fox similarly observed the insufficiency of national 
competition enforcement to regulate export cartels 
because it lacks legitimacy or capacity to reach 
competitive restraints on foreign soil; nonetheless, it 
mainly affects the domestic home market.62 Export cartels 
are often not covered by national competition laws when 
they do not affect the domestic market, neither directly 
or indirectly. Scholars argue that export cartels, to the 
extent that they are tolerated – if not encouraged – by 
the exporting States, are an effort of exporting States to 
boost domestic welfare at the expense of global welfare. 
More specifically, it is at the cost of the consumers’ 
welfare in the target market – a clear manifestation of a 
beggar-thy-neighbour conduct.63 On the contrary, there 
is a belief that the scarcity of empirical data on export 
cartels handicaps the attempts to analyse the issue 
on export cartels.64 The lack of data creates difficulties 
to determine the gravity of the anticompetitive harm 
that export cartels create; thus, the very assumptions 
on which the theory of the nexus of export cartel and 
anticompetitive conduct rely may be misguided.65
(IV) TRADE POLICIES
Like competition law, trade policy also contains both 
political and economic dimensions. It refers to the 
system of incentives put in place by a State with regard 
to production and consumption, including importation, 
exportation and trade of goods and services as aligned 
with the imposing state’s growth and development 
objectives.66 Trade policy involves various actions 
and tools such as the imposition of tariffs, quotas or 
restrictions, granting of subsidies to domestic industries 
and other measures often classified into two broad types: 
tariffs and non-tariff measures.67
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The tariff is the classic instrument of trade policy.68 
Tariffs are imposed to generate revenue but also, 
more importantly, to protect the domestic industry 
of the imposing country.69 However, with increasing 
trade liberalisation, most states covertly seek to 
protect domestic sectors through other instruments of 
trade policy such as non-tariff measures.70 Non-tariff 
measures include quotas, licences, technical barriers 
to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, export 
restrictions, custom surcharges, financial measures and 
anti-dumping measures.71 Whilst non-tariff measures 
may intrinsically be protectionist, they seem useful in 
addressing failures in the market such as externalities 
and the asymmetry of information between producers 
and consumers.72
Trade policy is historically determined on the basis of 
the macro and micro view.73 The micro view provides that 
the State adopts its trade policy in accordance with the 
preferences of its industrial constituents.74 Hence, under 
the micro view, trade policy refers to the ‘aggregate 
outcome of industry battles over protection.’ 75 The macro 
view, on the other hand, suggests that the trade policy of 
the State cannot simply be traced back to the preferences 
of its industrial constituents.76 Under the macro view, the 
trade policy of the State reflects the collective interest 
of the State and the State acts as an independent agent 
furthering the national State objectives. Trade policy in 
all countries consists of varying dimensions or levels. For 
example, the EU trade policy, in addition to its ‘unilateral’ 
liberalization, i.e. voluntarily providing preferential market 
access or zero tariffs for specific types of countries, also 
adopts bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral agreements 
as well as commercial instruments such as anti-dumping 
laws and other safeguards.77 The objectives pursued at 
each level of trade policy constantly changes.78 Different 
States negotiate in order to determine their international 
trade policies.79 Hence, bilateral, plurilateral or 
multilateral trade agreements are born, usually involving 
preferential tariff rates, agreements on investments, 
technology-sharing or single market objectives.80 In 
the context of protectionism, the ability of States to 
resolve trade disputes amongst themselves significantly 
influences protectionist positions.81 However, it is argued 
that protectionist trade policy is more than just a means 
of adjudicating trade disputes; rather, protectionism is 
pursued by certain States in order to further their national 
economic and political policies.82
PART II
PROTECTIONISM
Protectionism is a kind of trade policy aimed at impeding 
foreign trade access to the domestic market and 
preserving, if not improving, the position of domestic 
producers in contrast to foreign producers.83 With the 
decline of classic protectionism, i.e. the imposition of 
tariffs and other visible barriers to trade, comes the rise of 
‘murky’ protectionism, also known as new protectionism, 
which is characterised by seemingly innocuous and 
subtle measures designed to distort free trade without 
constituting as violations of the WTO rules or trade 
agreements.84 More aptly, murky protectionism has been 
defined as ‘abuses of legitimate discretion which are used 
to discriminate against foreign goods, companies, workers 
and investors’.85 Examples of murky protectionism are 
the imposition of regulatory and licensing requirements, 
tightening of product standards, limitation of ports of 
entry, introduction of bailout packages and initiation of 
disguised ‘green’ protectionism.86
Academic literature provides conflicting arguments 
regarding protectionism. Economic theory under the 
classic utility model establishes that any benefit that 
may result from protectionism is outweighed by its 
costs in terms of losses to consumer welfare and decline 
of economic growth.87 Another argument against 
protectionism is the moral argument which provides that 
protectionism is akin to stealing, i.e. producers and rent-
seeking individuals induce the government to pursue 
their interests and benefit at the expense of consumers, 
in effect taking away what is due.88 On the other hand, 
the most notable arguments in favour of protectionism 
are national defence, infant industry and strategic trade 
theory.89
The national defence argument authorises the 
protection of industries with a vital role in national 
security such as weapon manufacturing to ensure the 
States’ readiness in times of war or adversity.90 It is 
suggested that agricultural protectionism is subsumed 
under the national defence argument because food 
security and food availability are part of the States’ 
legitimate national interests.91 It has been noted that 
the EU’s agricultural protectionism resulted in growth 
of production, achievement of self-sufficiency in 
food security and stability in the common market for 
agricultural products.92
The infant industry argument provides that a State, in 
order to grow, must first strengthen its newly established 
industries which do not enjoy the cost and production 
efficiencies yet compared to its competitors; this is at 
least until it establishes its comparative advantage and 
the playing field has been levelled.93 Proponents for the 
protection of the infant industry assert that protection 
must only be temporary and the benefits provided by the 
protected industry must exceed the costs of protection, 
also known as the Mill-Bastable Test.94
The strategic trade theory, introduced by James 
Brander and Barbara Spencer, has also been used to 
support protectionism.95 According to the strategic 
trade theory, firms are inclined to take ‘strategic’ moves 
exhibiting aggressive behaviour; the State’s support of 
such national firms will further give more credence to 
such behaviour, in effect deterring potential rivals such 
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as foreign firms.96 Hence, strategic trade theory suggests 
the States can raise their national income at the expense 
of other States by supporting or promoting national firms 
in international competition.97
SECTION 3:  THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN COMPETITION LAW AND 
OTHER ISSUE AREAS 
(I) COMPETITION AND TRADE POLICIES
Competition and trade policies are both national 
policies used as tools for economic development, 
albeit with different objectives, principles, and scope. 
No consensus on the overall relationship between the 
two has yet been reached. It is suggested that the two 
policies could be mutually reinforcing, complementary, 
contradictory, or substitutes depending on how they 
are applied.98 Based on their basic objectives, efficiency 
and consumer welfare, competition and trade policies 
are perceived as mutually reinforcing.99 On the other 
hand, by dealing with private, anticompetitive conduct 
to ensure effective market access, competition policy 
is viewed as complementary with trade policy which is 
concerned with the removal of governmental actions. 
This facilitates the anti-competitive behaviour by private 
entities. Restrictive trade measures limit competition by 
curtailing the entry of foreign suppliers in the market as 
well as aiding anti-competitive practices by domestic 
firms; meanwhile, exclusions and exemptions from 
competition law, as well as lack of enforcement thereof, 
negatively impact trade.100
A contradictory relationship between competition 
and trade policy is also suggested as a result of their 
divergent aims and effects. Competition policy is 
concerned with consumer welfare, while trade policy is 
focused on the welfare of producers and is more easily 
influenced by special interest groups.101 Trade policy also 
has objectives which conflict with competition policy 
aims such as raising revenue, promoting self-sufficiency 
and supporting exports.102 Finally, competition policy 
and trade policy are also viewed as substitutes in some 
respects. For instance, the WTO found that competition 
law provisions relating to price discrimination serve 
as a substitute for anti-dumping measures in some 
circumstances.103
The impact of anti-competitive business practices 
on international trade is the most important concern in 
trade policy.104 Experts105 recognise that anti-competitive 
practices of firms, in addition to trade barriers, hamper 
international trade. Hence, the necessity to integrate or 
at least align competition and trade policies has been 
formally recognised as early as the proposal for the 
establishment of the International Trade Organisation 
(Havana Charter). The Havana Charter contained 
provisions which encourage member States to prohibit 
business practices that affect international trade which 
restrain competition, limit access to markets, or foster 
monopolistic control whenever such practices are 
harmful to trade.106 Nonetheless, the Havana Charter 
was not ratified and was instead succeeded by the 
GATT of 1947, which salvaged some of the provisions 
from the Havana Charter. Thus, the negotiating parties 
that created the GATT of 1947 had shown a public 
awareness that arrangements designed to foster trade 
could be undermined when commercial enterprises 
engaged in cartels or other restrictive business practices, 
and these negotiating parties had proposed treaty 
provisions to ensure that competition policy would 
reinforce government measures for international 
trade.107 Subsequently, the World Trade Organisation 
was established in 1995 to succeed the GATT of 1947. 
Efforts to include competition policy within the trade 
policy framework in the WTO have proved particularly 
challenging due to lack of agreement among member 
States on competition policy.108 Support for international 
discipline regarding competition law was originally 
stimulated by US perceptions that international cartels 
and the absence or lack of enforcement of national 
competition law obstructed the ability of US firms to 
contest markets.109 The US supported the inclusion of 
a chapter dealing with restrictive business practices, 
reflecting its views against German cartels and Japanese 
zaibatsu who are the main opposition to including 
competition law in the WTO.110 In recent times, the EU 
has been in the lead, arguing that all WTO members 
must adopt and enforce competition laws. Developing 
countries have not been at the center of the debate 
on trade and competition in the WTO.111 However, 
competition policy has an important role in developing 
countries, both in promoting a competitive environment 
and in building and sustaining public support for a pro-
competitive policy stance. However, the issue is that 
many do not have competition laws; those that do often 
have limited implementation ability.112 The bottom line 
of the debate is that any agreement on international 
competition policy that goes beyond general procedural 
cooperation and introduction of transparency 
mechanisms likely must be plurilateral, at least initially. 
The lack of consensus on the nexus of competition 
and trade policy creates a gap which is exploited in order 
to pursue various motives such as promoting industrial 
policy, protectionism or nationalism.
(II) COMPETITION LAW AND PROTECTIONISM
In the United States, some scholars claim that antitrust 
law is rooted in protectionist institutions.113 Evidence 
reveals that the political impetus for antitrust law 
originated from lobbying farmers of several agricultural 
states;114 however, the majority views of scholars differs 
on this.115 Inefficient businesses misused antitrust laws by 
suing their efficient competitors for lower prices, increase 
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in output and product or process innovation116 Today, the 
use of antitrust law for protectionism is no longer limited 
to the protection of an industry from another within the 
domestic sphere; it extends to the international level and 
transcends international trade. Similarly, in the European 
Union, remnants of industrial policy abound in the EC 
competition law.117 The European Commission has been 
attacked on the ground of ‘disguised protectionism’, 
protecting EU-based competitors and furthering the 
single market objective rather than seeking to uphold 
competition in strict terms.118 This is clearly demonstrated 
in the proposed Siemens-Alstom merger. In prohibiting 
the proposed consolidation of Siemens and Alstom, the 
European Commission unleashed a turmoil of political 
discontent; arguably, this is more the manifestation 
of longstanding frustration with certain underlying 
asymmetries within merger regulation which impede the 
ascendancy of the European industry on the world stage 
than an issue with the Commission’s decision itself.119
Competition law, as a political creation, is inherently 
susceptible to ‘instrumentalisation’ for protectionist 
ends. Competition law is at risk of being misused to 
advance industrial policies, political agendas and 
protectionist policies in the guise of competition 
enforcement, thus bypassing the scrutiny of international 
trade agreements.120 The existing legislative framework 
of competition law enhances this risk, as it provides 
for greater discretion in decision making and political 
involvement in the enforcement of competition law.121 
While open-ended discretionary standards are laudable 
because economic analysis cannot be put into rigid 
standards as each competition case is unique, it also 
creates opportunities for abuse. Discretion may be 
abused to allow regulators to pursue their own private 
interests, shirk unpleasant duties, augment their 
regulatory authority in hopes of increasing monopoly 
rents which they can trade to interest groups in return 
for personal benefits, and act in other ways that are 
contrary to the public good.122 In the context of merger 
law, for instance, discretion may incentivise regulators to 
pursue protectionism – in particular, new protectionism. 
Trade agreements and institutions such as the WTO 
have made traditional protectionism through open trade 
discrimination challenging. Yet, the underlying political 
dynamic driving protectionism has not gone away. 
Hence, while jurisdictions do not forbid certain mergers, 
they can still discriminate against them. For instance, 
regulators can require more onerous ‘fixes’ for mergers 
that threaten local producers such as requiring the 
merging parties to divest assets in a way that benefits 
the domestic competitor.123
Indeed, the argument that competition law may 
be a tool to pursue a protectionist end is commonly 
premised upon the possibility that competition law – 
especially through selective, discriminatory enforcement 
– might actually be abused as a trade barrier.124 National 
protectionism is often demanded by certain industries or 
interest groups.125 However, a competition regime that 
favours domestic firms such as local producers hurt not 
only the producers and consumers of other countries, 
but also the domestic consumers.
(III) MERGER REGULATION AND 
PROTECTIONISM
One area of competition law that has always been 
suspected as an instrument of protectionism is merger 
regulation; the failed merger of Siemens-Alstom is a good 
case in point. Merger regulation is one of the pillars of 
competition policy aimed at preserving market competition 
in the event of business combinations and takeovers.126 
However, preservation of competition is not the only 
rationale for the enforcement of merger regulations; 
national security, businesses perceived to be of national 
strategic importance, technological capabilities, jobs and 
export also influence merger control enforcement.127 
Thus, the protectionism hypothesis posits that merger 
regulation is used as a tool to protect domestic firms 
from competition.128 In addition to protection of domestic 
firms, which is often associated with the infant industry 
argument, States are also suspected of using merger 
regulations to promote its national champions on the 
premise of strategic trade theory. In the context of merger 
control, the notion of a national champion generally 
means that the government encourages or does not 
prevent a merger between two domestic firms to create a 
more powerful entity, or it opposes the acquisition of one 
of the domestic firms by a foreign company.129
A study has found that, while merger regulation 
has deterred anticompetitive mergers, it has also 
protected rival producers from increased competition 
due to efficient mergers.130 In the context of EU merger 
policy, an empirical analysis to prove the protectionist 
hypothesis concluded a direct correlation between the 
likelihood of opposition to the merger by the competition 
authority when the bidder is a foreign national and the 
expected adverse effect of the reviewed merger on 
domestic competitors.131 After reforms on the EU Merger 
Regulation were introduced in 2004, the hypothesis was 
re-examined and change in protectionist tendencies 
were discovered.132 The result was more consistent with 
a recent empirical study that showed the Commission 
has not intervened more frequently or extensively in 
transactions involving a non-EU- or US-based firm’s 
acquisition of a European target.133 Nonetheless, there 
has been no conclusive findings on the absence of 
protectionism. At most, empirical analyses have shifted 
the burden of proof to those advancing the view.
Despite these empirical results disproving the use of 
merger regulation for protectionist purposes, persistent 
allegations abound. The political model of antitrust 
established that merger decisions are influenced by 
political contributions of lobby groups representing 
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special interests, political pressures and social welfare 
considerations.134 For instance, Bu argues that the 
decision of Chinese competition authority to block the 
merger between Coca Cola and Huiyuan illustrates the 
influence of non-competition considerations such as 
protectionism on merger regulation enforcement.135 The 
lack of sufficient analysis as well as broad conclusions 
reached on the decision left no other conclusion but 
that China was trying to protect its home-grown, local 
company from potential brand dilution once absorbed 
by Coca Cola.136 Another example is the opposition of 
the US to the potential merger between Broadcom, a 
Singapore-based company, and Qualcomm, an American 
telecommunication chip manufacturer, on the grounds 
of national security.137 In the EU, its opposition to the 
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger was suspected to arise 
from protectionist sentiment because of the merger’s 
adverse impact on the rival EU firm Airbus.138
(IV) EXPORT CARTELS EXEMPTION AND 
PROTECTIONISM
Export cartel exemptions are instruments of competition 
policy for trade policy ends.139 By tolerating, if not 
supporting, anticompetitive conduct just because it does 
not affect the domestic market, exporting states in effect 
assist or condone the harm caused to the importing 
states.140 Hence, export cartel exemptions are perceived 
as tools for protectionism in this context of the beggar-
thy-neighbour approach.
In the context of trade policy, export cartel exemptions 
produce the same economic effect as export subsidies 
or aids.141 While both harm competition at the expense 
of foreign markets and foreign competitors, only export 
subsidies are regulated under the WTO rules.142 However, 
State-run export cartel are challengeable under WTO 
rules with different outcomes depending on the State.143 
Hence, the difficulty in prosecuting export cartels that 
have anti-competitive effects is considered a trade 
dilemma. In Argentina, based on Measures Affecting 
the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished 
Leather,144 the WTO Panel noted that the WTO rules 
do not obligate its members ‘to assume a full “due 
diligence” burden to investigate and prevent cartels from 
functioning as private export restrictions’.145
The United States, through the Webb-Pomerene Act 
of 1918,146 explicitly exempted export cartels and export 
association from the Sherman Act147 and from Section 7 
of the Clayton Act,148 which has been reinforced by the 
Export Trading Company Act of 1982149 and the Foreign 
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act150 which regulated 
export cartels by granting them certificates. The EU, on 
the other hand, while it does not explicitly exempt export 
cartels, Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU151 provide for 
the limited application of the EU competition law to 
conduct that produces anticompetitive effects (objective 
or subjective) within the internal market and to the trade 
between Member States. Hence, the EU competition law 
implicitly allows export cartels if they do not influence 
the EU internal market.
Strategic trade theory is often used to explain the 
States’ support for export cartels.152 Exporting States, 
by supporting their domestic firms engaged in export 
cartels, increase their national income through export 
revenues and promote producers’ (exporters’) welfare at 
the expense of the importing States. Under the strategic 
trade theory, exporting States will oppose any of the 
extraterritorial enforcement of competition law by the 
importing State, which curtails the export cartels.153 Just 
as blocking statuses show the applicability of domestic 
competition laws to anticompetitive acts and measures 
of State and State-owned firms internally. This is 
evidenced by the (Blocking) Order which hinders foreign 
investigations and enforcement of foreign decisions and 
judgments against Russian strategic enterprises.154 In 
addition, non-cooperation with the importing State’s 
investigation may also be due to the lack of incentive for 
an exporting State to immediately discipline the export 
cartel since it does not have any adverse effect on the 
domestic economy.155 Not only current trade laws but 
also national competition laws are insufficient to address 
the problem of anticompetitive conduct in foreign States 
which is prejudicial to the target State; this results from 
the fundamental differences between competition policy 
and trade policy.156
SECTION 4: ANALYSIS: THE EU AND US
The preceding sections discussed various connections 
or relationships, including between competition law and 
protectionism, particularly the use of merger regulation 
and export cartels as tools to pursue protectionist 
policies. While conclusions on the relationship between 
competition and protectionism were drawn from 
circumstantial evidence rather than direct, the risk of the 
use of competition law for protectionist ends is undeniably 
high. Another key takeaway is that discretionary 
decision-making combined with the political element 
in competition law enforcement allows jurisdictions to 
tailor their competition law to fit their industrial policies 
such as nationalism and protectionism. 
It is also noted that there are two ways in which 
merger regulation can be used as a tool for protectionism. 
The first is through the law itself. The law governing 
merger regulation may expressly provide for protection 
or promotion of certain domestic industries or firms. The 
second is through the enforcement of merger regulation. 
Enforcement is influenced by the underlying protectionist 
policy pursued by the State or political involvement and 
discretionary bias of the enforcing authority. Between 
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the two, the second mode is the most common because 
no jurisdiction will willingly and explicitly recognise the 
promotion or protection of national champions as a 
specific goal of competition law;157 hence, merger control 
policy is often referred to as ‘disguised protectionism’. This 
section will focus on analysing how merger regulation 
and export cartels are used to pursue protectionist 
policies in the EU and US. 
4.1 THE EU ANALYSIS
(i)  Competition law and protectionist policy: 
analysing merger regulation from an EU perspective
At first glance, there is nothing in the EU Merger 
Regulation (EUMR)158 which indicates that the objective 
of merger regulation is to pursue protectionism, nor 
to explicitly promote or protect national champions, 
certain industries, or domestic firms. The EUMR requires 
the Commission to be notified in advance of all mergers 
which have a community dimension.159 The (EUMR) 
whereas clause provides that the EU Merger Regulation 
is grounded on the principles enshrined in Articles 3(1)
(g) and 4 of the EC Treaty, which provides for undistorted 
competition in the internal market and conduct under 
the principle of an open market economy with free 
competition. The EUMR explicitly highlights that it is in 
line with the policy of open market and free competition. 
Taken together with open pronouncements of the EU 
Commission for competition policy against the use of 
merger control for protectionist purposes as well as their 
commitment to ensure merger control is not misused 
to pursue nationalistic or protectionist goals,160 this 
indicates that the EUMR has an avowed and expressed 
anti-protectionist policy.161
One significant provision of the EUMR that is often 
linked to protectionism is Article 21, which can be 
characterised as a double-edged sword. Although it is 
a powerful tool against the threat of protectionism, it is 
a loophole that presents an opportunity to be exploited 
for protectionist ends. Under Article 21(4), Member 
States retain the right to take appropriate measures to 
protect legitimate interests other than those taken into 
consideration by the regulation or those compatible 
with the general principles and other provisions of 
community law.162 This recognizes that Member States 
may have ‘legitimate interest’ in investigating a merger 
beyond harm to competition.163 This provision creates a 
gap in the law that Member States can exploit to pursue 
protectionist ends. Significant government interventions 
on the ground of ‘legitimate interest’ on merger cases164 
illustrate attempts by Member States to use merger 
regulation to pursue protectionism. This is in line with the 
political economic perspective that politics is represented 
by the State as a sovereign political unit. 
Even though Article 21 EUMR appears to be a powerful 
tool to prevent Member States from interfering with 
cross-border transactions in theory, the Commission’s 
record of its enforcement appears unsatisfactory.165 
The Commission has never managed to overturn a 
member State’s opposition to a merger; at most, the 
Commission’s intervention facilitated negotiations 
between the concerned authorities and the acquirer.166 It 
is also noted that in some of the cases such as that of the 
Italian Banks,167 E.ON/Endesa and Abertis/Autostrade, the 
Commission seemed ineffective in the face of Member 
States’ inaction which led to lasting uncertainties for 
companies and, in most cases, the cancellation of 
merger plans.168 In addition, Article 21 requires that the 
thresholds set by EUMR are met; hence, the creation of 
national champions which achieve most of their turnover 
within one and the same Member State do not fall 
within the jurisdiction of the Commission because of the 
application of the two thirds rule.169 Lastly, while Article 
21 may be considered a tool against protectionism by 
the Member States, it is worth noting that the EU itself 
might be protectionist against non-EU States.
Another issue with the EUMR is that too much 
discretion is granted to the Commission. The Commission 
is granted exclusive powers to assess concentration 
operations with a community dimension which relates to 
combined aggregate turnover. The discretionary power 
granted to the Commission can be subjected to political 
pressures and discretionary bias, which may lead the 
Commission to pursue non-competition goals such as 
protectionism. This supports the proposition of political 
realism that power is the end of political action, whether 
in the domestic realm or international arena. A study 
found that, both before and after the reform of EU merger 
regulation,170 based on its wide power, the Commission’s 
decision rule included both competition and non-
competition variables. The Commission’s interpretation 
of ‘effective competition’ extends beyond the 
competitive effects of mergers on consumer welfare and 
certainly includes industrial policy motives.171 However, 
protectionist motives have not been established as the 
impact of nationality of the merging firms on the merger 
decision appears insignificant.172 This approach, however, 
is inaccurate because of its binary representation of 
merger decisions – either blocked or allowed. Hence, it 
fails to capture the underlying protectionist motives in 
allowing mergers where there is a discriminatory merger 
fix imposed. Protectionist motives on merger regulation 
enforcement may be clearer in the cases’ decisions.
The EU is often accused of protectionism because 
of its opposition to certain mergers which have been 
cleared by several competition authorities such as 
the cases of Boeing/McDonnell Douglas173 and GE/
Honeywell.174 The EU is accused of discriminating 
against foreign firms to protect or promote its domestic 
firms. The Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas saga focused 
on a proposed merger between two American airline 
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manufacturers which wanted to establish the world’s 
largest aerospace company.175 The American Federal 
Trade Commission duly approved the merger, but it was 
opposed by the EU Commission. The Commission blocked 
the merger primarily because Boeing would strengthen 
its dominant opposition and because of the merger’s 
potential exclusionary effect on Airbus, its competitor, 
as a result of Boeing’s intention for all purchasers of 
Boeing aircraft to sign 20-year exclusivity deals.176 The 
US suspected that the Commission’s criticism of the 
merger had more to do with general industrial policy 
fears and an impulse to protect Airbus, so it regarded 
the European hostility to this venture as little more 
than knee-jerk protectionism.177 Just as the realists 
subscribe,   States enrich their power and wealth at the 
expense of their neighbouring States to obtain political 
and economic security. Nevertheless, because Boeing 
made concessions and changed its proposed transaction 
in order to comply with the Commission’s antitrust 
policies, the Commission ultimately did not block the 
merger and the crisis was averted.178 This suggests that 
the international area/scene is inherently unstable. 
With regard to GE/Honeywell, Schmitz argues that the 
Commission’s decision reflects the EU competition 
law’s goal to protect small and medium enterprises 
from dominant competitors which is traceable from its 
ordoliberal underpinnings.179 The protection of small 
and medium enterprises may be subsumed under the 
infant industry argument in favour of protectionism.180 
However, the proposed Siemens-Alstom merger that was 
prohibited is a lucid manifestation of long-established 
frustrations with underlying asymmetries in the Merger 
Regulation. This which obstructs the dominance of the 
European industry within the global arena rather than 
the decision of the Commission, as being claimed on its 
protection of SME internally. 181
(ii) Competition law and protectionist policy: 
analysing export cartel from EU perspective
Cartels in general are governed by Article 101 of the TFEU 
which prohibits ‘all agreements between undertakings, 
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted 
practices which may affect trade between Member States 
and which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the internal 
market’.182 The EU adheres to the effects doctrine when 
prosecuting anticompetitive behaviour, i.e. when the 
conduct has a significant effect on the internal market.183 
In the case of export cartels, Article 101 will not apply 
because there is no effect on trade between the Member 
States, nor will competition within the common market 
be prevented, restricted or distorted. Generally, a scheme 
of exemptions is not necessary when cartels are only 
prohibited after the application of an effects test of 
some kind.184 The EU, including through the decisions of 
its courts, has implicitly exempted export cartels from 
its competition law. This amounts to protectionism 
because the EU in effect condones or allows the anti-
competitive behaviour of its domestic firms which has an 
adverse effect on other states. This ‘tolerance’ amounts 
to a beggar-thy-neighbour policy which is inherently 
protectionist.185 This is in line with the prescription of 
legal and political realism; the legal realist is attached to 
social reform and expects laws to serve as an instrument 
for social action by emphasising the interrelationship 
between legal rules and policy objectives. 
As a result of the implicit nature of exemptions of 
export cartel by the EU, export cartels are not required 
to notify the Commission or register, nor are they 
supervised or regulated in any manner.186 This insufficient 
information fails to establish the real economic effects of 
export cartels within the EU.187 Furthermore, sanctioning 
an export cartel headquartered in the EU would require 
an extraterritorial application of competition law by the 
importing State.188
4.2 THE US ANALYSIS
(i) Competition law and protectionist policy: 
analysing merger regulation from a US perspective
Similarly as in the EU, the laws governing merger 
regulation do not expressly pursue protectionism. The 
US merger regulation is primarily governed by section 
7 of the Clayton Act189 which prohibits concentrations 
that substantially lessen competition or tend to create 
a monopoly. The Sherman Act may also substantially 
govern mergers by prohibiting restrictive agreements190 
and monopolies.191 US merger regulation, unlike the EU, 
has not faced protectionist accusations until recently. 
During the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas saga, the EU 
accused the US of promoting national champions by 
clearing the merger of two US companies. Recently, the 
US also faced accusations of protectionism from China 
when the Trump administration openly opposed what 
would have been the biggest tech merger in history 
between Broadcom and Qualcomm for national security 
reasons;192 Qualcomm is a leading US company in the 
telecommunications sector whilst Broadcom is an Asian 
firm with ties to China.193 It is believed that the US was 
motivated to block the potential merger because the 
deal would have allowed Asia to overtake the US in the 
race for global dominance in telecommunications.194 
This clearly projects the realist view that, to obtain 
political gain and security, States enrich their power and 
wealth at the expense of other States. Furthermore, the 
opposition is pursuant to the protectionist policy of the 
Trump administration, which also imposed tariffs on 
steel and aluminium on grounds of national security.195 
Although these tariffs preceded the potential merger, 
and it is too early to determine if the merger regulation 
will indeed be used to pursue protectionist ends in the US. 
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The Broadcom/Qualcomm situation shows how political 
intervention and protectionist motives can influence 
decision makers in regulatory approvals.
(ii) Competition law and protectionist policy: 
analysing export cartel from a US perspective 
The US generally treats cartels as unlawful regardless of 
any proof of adverse effects.196 Hence, it was imperative 
for the US to create explicit exemptions to export 
cartels through the Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918 and 
subsequently through both the Foreign Trade Antitrust 
Improvements Act of 1982 and Export Trading Company 
Act of 1982.197 On the basis of these laws, export cartels 
are exempted provided that they do not have substantial 
effects on American internal or external commerce.198 
Just like the EU, the US does not prosecute export cartels 
since they are exempted from their jurisdictions as long 
as they do not affect competition within the domestic 
State. Nonetheless, the anticompetitive effects of export 
cartels are ‘externalised’ and the adverse impacts are 
felt by the States where the export cartels operate. 
Firms participating in export cartels achieve the status 
of monopoly and earn high profits at the expense of 
consumers (in the foreign States). In this sense, there is 
a maximisation of interests in agreement with the realist 
perspective; by expressly allowing export cartels despite 
knowledge of the welfare effects of cartels in the areas 
in which they operate, the US strengthens their export 
position to the detriment of foreign States, thus engaging 
in protectionism.
4.3 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EU AND US 
COMPETITION LAW AND PROTECTIONIST 
POLICY
According to Dabbah, there are two ways in which States 
can utilise competition law to impair free trade and 
restrict access of foreign firms to domestic markets. One 
is the exemption under national competition law, and the 
other is the strategic application of domestic competition 
law.199 For example, the export cartel exemption by the EU 
and the US illustrates the first exemption, while alleged 
discriminatory and selective enforcement of merger 
regulation by the EU and the US fit the second mode. In 
this context, both the EU and the US seem to be guilty of 
using competition law as tools for protectionism.
However, neither the EU nor the US will openly admit 
to such an allegation. An examination of the laws 
governing mergers and export cartels revealed that, 
at least textually, merger regulation and treatment 
of export cartels of both countries are founded on the 
adherence to free trade and trade liberalisation. The 
foundation of free trade and trade liberalisation can 
be traced to David Ricardo’s theory on comparative 
advantage.200 Under the supply and demand analysis 
of the neoclassical economics model, free trade results 
in lower production cost and better quality of products 
for consumers.201 The repeated mentioning of the 
phrases like ‘protection or maintenance of competition 
in markets’ or ‘ensuring competition is not distorted’ in 
the texts of the competition laws of the EU and the US 
is clearly evident of both States’ adherence to the liberal 
perspective. In connection to the international political 
economy approach, liberals give primacy to the individual 
consumer, firm or entrepreneur and view individuals as 
having inalienable rights that must be protected from 
collectivises such as the State.202 Therefore, in relation 
to competition law, the enforcement will be limited to 
the correction of market failures, and individuals and 
firms are mostly left alone with limited State regulation. 
In export cartel exemption, the EU appears to be more 
liberal than the US in the sense that the EU excludes 
export cartels from its jurisdiction as long as they do 
not have any effect in the internal market. The US, on 
the other hand, regulates the export cartels by requiring 
them to register. Although both the EU and US intervene 
in mergers, they remain liberal States in the sense that 
they only intervene upon notification and breach of 
certain specified thresholds.
Suspicions of protectionism mainly arise as a result 
of conflicting merger decisions. Accusations regarding 
the use of merger regulation for protectionist ends 
are stronger in the EU compared to the US. However, 
Fox argues that the EU is not necessarily protectionist; 
instead, the difference between the merger decisions 
of the EU and the US stems from the divergence of 
the goals pursued by the competition policy of each 
jurisdiction.203 The US antitrust goal is centred on 
consumer welfare whereas the EU competition goal aims 
to protect competitive processes. While both adhere to 
(liberal theoretical underpinning of) international political 
economy, the EU and the US differ in their priorities. The 
US champions consumer welfare alone, while the EU 
considers other goals such as competition in the internal 
market as well as overall welfare. The EUMR considers 
not only the effect on consumer welfare of the proposed 
merger but also its potential exclusionary effect.204 More 
aptly, the EU is inclined to oppose a merger if it is aimed 
at creating or strengthening a position that will facilitate 
an abuse of dominance and exclude competitors.205 
Although Anderson et al. admit the certainty of 
involvement of the political element on merger 
decisions, they support Fox’s argument that the EU is not 
necessarily protectionist and propose three reasons for 
the divergence in views on mergers.206 First, competition 
authorities apply different rules of substantive analysis 
in merger assessment. Second, each jurisdiction has a 
unique market situation and conditions of competition. 
Third, competition authorities simply reach different 
conclusions based on the facts and evidence available 
to them. In the case of the US and the EU, while there 
are no substantial differences in merger regulation, 
each jurisdiction utilises different evaluation criteria 
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and prioritizes different aspects of competition law.207 
Consistently, empirical studies support this finding and 
have rebutted the protectionist hypothesis, at least in the 
EU context such as with the EU’s selective enforcement 
of its merger regulation to protect domestic firms.208
Nevertheless, the analysis of laws involving merger 
regulation and previous merger decisions revealed that 
the political element and industrial policy motivations, 
whether protectionist or not, are evident in both the 
EU and the US. Despite the lack of direct evidence to 
prove the use of merger regulation for protectionist 
ends, the likelihood is significantly high; this is especially 
clear in the case of the pre-emptive blocking of the 
potential Broadcom/Qualcomm merger under the Trump 
administration which had an open protectionist or 
nationalist stance in line with the prescriptions of legal/
political realist theory. 
In the case of export cartels, the absence of export 
cartel prosecutions serves as an impediment in completely 
determining whether export cartel exemptions serve 
protectionist ends. However, this article has found that 
both the EU and the US exempt export cartels from 
their competition law. Economic analysis suggests that 
export cartels decreases supply and increase prices.209 
Export cartels that lead to monopolies also create a 
dead-weight loss to the overall welfare. In addition to 
the economic or quantifiable effects, export cartels may 
also lead to qualitative effects such as food shortages, a 
rise in tensions between States and retaliatory acts from 
trading partners.210 Therefore, at least theoretically, as 
expressly argued in the case study of the US and implied 
in the case study of the EU, the tolerance of export 
cartel operations in foreign States amounts to beggar-
thy-neighbour polices. These are inherently protectionist 
or mercantilist because they serve to strengthen the 
export position of the EU and the US at the expense 
or detriment of the importing jurisdictions. From the 
international political economy perspective, export cartel 
exemptions of the EU and the US lean towards realist 
theoretical underpinnings. Realists place the primacy 
on politics and believe that the economy is a creation of 
the State.211 Mercantilism refers to when states, under 
the realists’ perspective, aim to increase their national 
power at the expense of other states and consumers.212 
Some concepts supported by mercantilism include the 
promotion and protection of national industries, national 
security or strategic trade theory. Hence, mercantilist 
arguments ultimately aim to increase exports, improve 
balance of payments and accumulate national wealth 
with realist intentions.213
SECTION 5: CONCLUSION
This article examines how the EU and the US use their 
competition law, particularly regarding merger regulation 
and export cartels, for protectionist ends. 
In the context of academic literature, the article 
identifies the goals and underlying motivations of 
competition policy and trade policy. Competition law 
primarily rests on two schools of thought – the Chicago 
School and the Harvard School, which is reflected on 
its enforcement, e.g. whether it is welfare-centred or 
structure-centred, respectively. Scholarly works establish 
the arguments in favour of protectionism such as national 
defence, protection of infant industry and strategic trade 
theory. The relevant concepts and principles in the article, 
which have been identified by scholars as mergers, 
export cartels, competition law, protectionism and trade 
policy, were conceptualised for clearer familiarisation 
and understanding.
It is suggested that concerns regarding the link 
between competition policy and trade policy have 
been around since the pre-GATT period. There have 
also been attempts to integrate the competition policy 
with the WTO framework. Nonetheless, studies linking 
competition law and protectionism remained scant. While 
the protectionist tendencies of EU merger regulation 
enforcement have been explored empirically, little or 
nothing has been found in the US context. Furthermore, 
studies that relate export cartels to protectionism are 
mainly based on theoretical assumptions given the lack 
of empirical data to establish the economic effects of 
export cartels.
The analysis section discusses the link between 
merger regulation, export cartels and protectionism in 
the EU and the US perspectives as well as a comparative 
analysis between the two. The article finds a few 
similarities between the EU and US perspectives on 
competition law and trade policy nexus. First, both 
adhere to trade liberalisation goals, at least based on 
the text of their competition law and the foundations of 
both merger regulation and export cartel exemptions. 
Second, there is lack of direct evidence for both the EU 
and the US to establish the use of merger regulation 
for protectionist ends through discriminatory merger 
regulation enforcement; however, there is certainty of 
the political element in decision-making. Third, both 
grant wide discretion to competition authority, which 
opens opportunities for lobbying and promotion of 
special interests or other non-competition goals. Fourth, 
both exempt export cartels, which theoretically amounts 
to mercantilism. However, the EU and the US have 
diverging trade policies and aims for competition law. 
The US is consumer-welfare centred whereas the EU 
ensures undistorted competition in the internal market. 
The US under the Trump administration openly pursued 
protectionist policies while the EU is on the lookout for 
protectionist tendencies of its Member States.
 This article finds that there have been calls for a unified 
approach to competition law or a single international 
competition law regime. However, it has been established 
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that competition law reflects varying goals, objectives, 
priorities, politics, culture, and environments of each 
enforcing jurisdiction. Hence, in the light of these findings, 
the article proffers creating a set of principles of competition 
policy, rather than a single competition law regime, that 
will align all competition laws and address the gap being 
exploited to pursue protectionist ends. A case in point is 
China, which has a growing competition law regime but is 
also suspected of using competition law for protectionism 
as in the merger case of Coca-Cola v Huiyuan.
In conclusion, this article examines how the EU and 
the US use merger regulation and export cartels to 
further protectionist aims. While there is an absence 
of direct evidence establishing the use of competition 
law as a tool for protectionist policies, there is also no 
evidence of the absence of protectionist motives in 
enforcing competition law. Hence, one can deduce only 
by conjecture that there is a significant likelihood of States 
utilising competition law for protectionism either through 
selective and discriminatory enforcement or exemption 
of anticompetitive practices from competition law. To 
illustrate, the European Commission proposed a ‘new 
antitrust tool’ (aimed at tackling foreign subsidies)214 
and the recent revisions to the UK merger rules to catch 
foreign acquisition of companies in sensitive or more 
viable sectors.215
The likelihood that States will use competition law 
as such becomes clear when considering the natural 
inclination of States to pursue protectionist policies 
under the realist theoretical underpinnings as well as the 
sponge nature of competition law. Therefore, in order 
to address this gap which neither competition law nor 
trade policy can address, States need to agree on unified 
underlying principles of competition law.
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